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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
MICHAEL STEWARD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 900158 CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of right made pursuant to Title 77, Part 
35, Section 26 of the Utah Code and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. This court has appellate jurisdiction in 
this case pursuant to Title 28, Part 2a, Section 3(2) of the Utah 
Code. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction of the 
third degree felony offenses of possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute entered in the 
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County following a 
bench trial before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District 
Judge. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether it violates the fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution to intercept all traffic entering a street 
where homes are being searched for drugs pursuant to warrants, to 
detain for questioning all persons who give a searched home as 
their destination, and to search all persons so detained and 
their vehicles for weapons• 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The appellant, Michael Steward, was charged by information 
with the third degree felonies of possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute and simple possession of methamphetamine in 
violation of Section 58-37-1(a)(i),(iv), Utah Code. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition 
Prior to trial, appellant made a motion "to suppress any 
evidence seized from the defendant as a result of the stop of the 
defendant's vehicle and the search of said vehicle." (R-13). An 
evidentiary hearing was held at which the defendant argued that 
the detention of the appellant and the subsequent searches and 
seizures violated appellantfs right to be secure against 
unreasonable searches and seizures (Transcript, Motion to 
Suppress Hearing, [hereinafter cited as "MT"] at 47, 48) as 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. (MT 52). The 
district court denied that motion and entered Findings, 
Conclusions and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress (R-
20) . 
The matter was tried to the bench without jury.1 The 
1
 There is no waiver of right to jury in the trial 
transcript but a minute entry (R-15) shows that the defendant 
waived his right to jury at the pre-trial conference. 
3 
defendant's motion to suppress was renewed and his objection 
overruled (TT-83) and evidence that 0.24 grams of methamphetamine 
(TT-76) and $5,257.00 in cash (TT-30, 62) were found on his 
person and 7.2 ounces of marijuana were found in his vehicle was 
admitted. (TT-89). Based on that evidence, the court found the 
defendant guilty of both counts. (Transcript, Trial, January 26, 
1990, 1:30 p.m. at 10-11). 
The defendant was fined and his prison sentence suspended on 
the condition, among others, that he serve a year in jail. (R-
31, 33) . This court issued a Certificate of Probable Cause and 
stayed the jail term and payment of the fine pending appeal. The 
other conditions of probation remain in effect. (R-52). 
Relevant Facts 
On August 20, 1989, a joint task force of federal and local 
law enforcement officers executed search warrants for a 
methamphetamine laboratory and controlled substances on three 
homes on a dead-end street in Copperton, Utah. The Salt Lake 
City Police Department Special Weapons and Tactics Team 
(S.W.A.T. Team) was assigned to make entry and secure one of the 
homes. (Transcript, Motion to Suppress Hearing, January 2, 1990 
[hereinafter "MT"] at 4, 6). A handgun was located in the home 
searched by the S.W.A.T. team and other weapons were found in the 
4 
other homes searched. (MT-11). 
After, securing the home and turning it over to narcotics 
officers for the detailed search, the S.W.A.T. team took up a 
position at the entrance of the street to intercept entering 
traffic. The street was approximately 150 yards long with six to 
eight homes on it. (MT-7) . One of the homes targeted in the 
warrants was located by the entrance to the dead-end street; the 
two others were at its end. (Transcript, Trial, January 26, 
1990, 10:00 a.m. [hereinafter "TT"] at 16). There were over ten 
police vehicles involved in the searches causing some congestion 
on the street. (MT-22). 
According to a plan formulated before the searches began, 
(MT-25) the S.W.A.T. team was to stop all vehicles entering the 
street and determine their destination. (MT-8). Anybody who was 
going to one of the targeted homes was to be detained to be 
questioned by narcotics officers. (MT-9, 24). All persons so 
detained would have their vehicles and persons searched for 
weapons. (TT-17-19, 41). Persons going to other than the 
targeted homes would be directed where to park and escorted to 
their destination. (MT-9).2 
z
 The record does not disclose how many vehicles were 
stopped during the course of the operation but there is an 
indication that at least two persons other than appellant were 
detained for questioning by narcotics officers. (MT-60). 
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The S.W.A.T. team was composed of at least four, and 
probably more, officers dressed in green, military style uniforms 
with police patches on their shoulders and hats. (TT-14). The 
street was not barricaded or blocked off. (TT-14). Instead, the 
team concealed itself in the shadows and, when a car pulled into 
the street, stepped out and signaled it to stop. (MT-20). 
At 11:50 p.m., one hour and twenty minutes after the search 
of the homes began, (MT-22) the appellant, driving a pick-up 
truck, turned into the street. (MT-12). The S.W.A.T. team 
stepped out and waved at him to stop. The appellant "stopped the 
vehicle, and then put the vehicle in reverse as if to back out."3 
(MT-12). The truck "just barely started to move backward," (TT-
16, 17), and travelled a foot or two. (TT-17) . An officer 
opened the driver's door, identified himself as an officer and 
told appellant to stop, which he did. (MT-12, 21). 
The appellant was asked his destination and responded that 
he was going to a house at the end of the street. He was 
ordered out of the truck and questioned further as to his 
destination and it was determined that he was going to Bailey's 
house, one of the houses being searched. At that point, the 
J
 The officer who testified thusly, later conceded on 
cross-examination that the vehicle may have been in neutral and 
rolled back as a result of the grade in the road. (TT-16, 
17)(Quoted infra at 26). 
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officers "patted down" appellant's person and searched the 
vehicle for weapons. (MT-15). During the search, a quantity of 
marijuana and numerous empty sandwich "baggies" were discovered 
in a gym bag on the floor in front of the passenger seat. (MT-
15) . 
The S.W.A.T. team alerted the narcotics officers by radio, 
and one of them came to the scene and placed the appellant under 
arrest. (MT-42). The appellant's jacket, which was in the 
truck, was searched before being returned to him and four 
thousand dollars in cash and a paper bindle containing a small 
amount of white powder were found. (MT-43). In a more thorough 
search of appellant's person, more than twelve hundred dollars 
in cash was found in his pants pocket. 
At trial it was established that there were 201 grams (7.2 
ounces) of marijuana in the gym bag. (TT-57) . An officer 
testified that in his opinion the amount of marijuana, the empty 
baggies and the large amount of cash indicated that the marijuana 
was possessed with intent to distribute. (TT-45). A state 
chemist testified that the paper bundle contained 0.24 grams of 
methamphetamine. Without the evidence seized in the challenged 
searches neither conviction would stand. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE OFFICERS LACKED AUTHORITY 
FOR THE INITIAL STOP THE SUBSEQUENT 
DETENTIONS AND SEARCHES WERE CONSTITUTIONALLY 
INVALID. 
(A) The trial court erred in concluding that the seizure 
did not occur until after the appellant was ordered out of his 
truck. A "seizure" as that term is used in the fourth amendment 
occurs whenever authority is used to stop a vehicle and the 
justification for the assertion of authority must be determined 
upon the facts known to the officer at the time the authority is 
asserted. The officers lacked the reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that a crime had occurred or was about to occur 
necessary to justify a stop of appellant in the first instance 
and his reaiction to their order to stop and the information 
acquired after the seizure of appellant cannot be used to justify 
the initial seizure. 
(B) Justification other then reasonable suspicion for the 
initial stop was neither argued nor considered by the district 
court and should not be raised upon appeal. Alternatively, the 
manner in which the check point was conducted maximized rather 
than minimized the fear and anxiety inflicted upon the innocent 
citizens who entered it and could not be justified as a 
reasonable exercise of police power. 
8 
II. ASSUMING THE VALIDITY OF THE INITIAL 
SEIZURE THE FURTHER DETENTION AND SEARCHES OF 
APPELLANT AND HIS VEHICLE WERE INVALID. 
The appellant was detained and searched pursuant to orders 
to detain and search for weapons all persons who gave as a 
destination one of the homes being searched pursuant to warrant, 
not because of his reaction when he was stopped. 
The conclusion of the district court that the appellant 
attempted to flee is not supported by the evidence. 
The totality of the circumstances did not raise a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity to justify the further detention 
or raise a reasonable belief that appellant was armed to justify 
a search for weapons. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE OFFICERS LACKED JUSTIFICATION 
FOR THE INITIAL STOP. 
(A) The district court's legal conclusion in denying the 
motion to suppress that "such a temporary seizure occurred when 
defendant was required to exit his truck by the police officers." 
(Conclusion of Law No. 2, R-22) is clearly erroneous. 
As this Court has held: 
The fourth amendment applies to brief 
investigation stops that fall short of 
official traditional arrests. Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968). The stopping of an 
9 
automobile and the consequent detention of 
its occupants constitute a "seizure" within 
the meaning of the fourth amendment, despite 
the fact that the purpose of the stop is 
limited and the resulting detention quite 
brief. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 649, 653 
(1979); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123 
(Utah 1983). 
State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988). The 
defendant was not ordered out of his vehicle until after he was 
stopped and it was determined that he was going to one of the 
houses being searched. (MT-15). The district court may have 
modified this conclusion in its Summary Decision on the 
appellant's application for a certificate of probable cause where 
it acknowledged that the information acquired from the appellant 
after the stop could not be used to justify the initial stop. 
(R-46, 47) . The district court did, however, reiterate at that 
time its reliance upon the appellant's reaction to the officers' 
signal to stop. (Ibid.) 
The difficulty with the district court's analysis is that it 
is bootstrapping justification of the officers' authority to 
order a stop with the suspect's reaction to that authority which 
is no different than justifying a stop by observations made as a 
result of the stop which is clearly not permissible. E.g., State 
v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988). In State v. Talbot, 
134 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (May 9, 1990) this court, in holding that 
flight alone did not raise enough reasonable suspicion of 
10 
criminal activity to justify a stop, observed it did not suggest 
that flight must be entirely ignored, 114 Utah Adv. Rep. at n. 
13. However, in that case the legality of the roadblock which 
apparently initiated the flight was not challenged on appeal nor 
considered by the court. 113 Utah Adv. Rep. at n. 4. Appellant 
here is challenging the officers1 authority to order him to stop 
in the first instance. This court in dictum in State v. Talbot, 
supra
 P at 19, n. 6, pointed out the fallacy in using a failure to 
stop in response to a police signal as justification for the 
stop: 
[I]t constitutes circular 
reasoning to suggest that police may use the 
subsequent failure to stop as the 
justification for a search and seizure which 
would have been unlawful had the defendant 
complied with the order to stop. Though we 
in no way encourage citizens to be their own 
judges about whether or not they are 
obligated to stop when ordered to do so by 
police, neither do we wish to encourage 
police to act on their hunches, signal a 
citizen to stop in the hope that the citizen 
will refuse, and use the failure to stop as a 
post facto justification for a stop which is 
otherwise without legal basis. 
At the time the officers1 asserted their authority to stop 
the appellant, the only facts they knew were that the appellant's 
vehicle, at 11:50 p.m., was entering a dead-end street where 
three out of the six or eight homes there were being searched for 
an illegal laboratory and controlled substances and some general 
11 
information that trucks and vans are sometimes used to transport 
materials to laboratories and customers and distributors 
frequently use late hours to make purchases from laboratories.4 
In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 Sup. Ct. 2637, 61 
L.Ed.2d. 357 (1979), the United States Supreme Court dealt with 
the validity of a stop of a man seen walking away from another 
man, with whom the officer believed he may have been transacting 
in drugs, in an "alley with a high intensity of drug 
trafficking". 
The Court stated: 
The fact that appellant was in a 
neighborhood frequented by drug users, 
standing alone, is not a basis for concluding 
that appellant himself was engaged in 
criminal conduct. 
99 Sup. Ct. at 2641. 
Driving a pick-up truck at 11:50 p.m. into a dead-end street 
where some of the homes are involved in drug activity is clearly 
an activity insufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion that the 
driver was involved in criminal activity which is required to 
justify even a momentary seizure under the fourth amendment. 
See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, supra? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 
4
 The court's Findings No. 3 says "frequently use late 
evening hours." (R-21). The testimony of the narcotics officer, 
however, was that no particular hour is specifically utilized and 
"The peak hours are the hours of darkness". (MT-34). 
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Sup. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 889 (1968), State v. Baird, supra; Davis, 
Exploring the Dimensions of the "Reasonable Suspicion11 Standard, 
UTAH BAR J. 8 (Oct. 1989). 
(B) The district court considered only the reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity justification for a brief 
investigatory stop which is the exception to the probable cause 
requirement developed in such cases as Terry v. Ohio, supra, and 
State v. Baird, supra. The state did not advance any other 
justification for the initial stop such as those set out for a 
permanent immigration checkpoint in United States v.Martinez -
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d. 1116 (1976), or 
for a drunk driving roadblock in Michigan Dept. of State Police 
v. Sitz. 58 LAW WEEK 4781 (June 14, 1990). When appellant's new 
counsel, who had not previously represented him in the district 
court, attempted to analyze the stop under the "checkpoint" 
justification law in connection with the application to the 
district court for a certificate of probable cause, he was 
rebuffed for raising a theory not previously argued. See, 
Summary Decision and Order (R-45, 47-48). Accordingly, the state 
should not be allowed to advance, for the first time on appeal, 
the theory that the stop was a reasonable exercise of police 
power in a "checkpoint" situation not requiring reasonable 
suspicion. See, State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Utah 
13 
1989) (standing issue) ; State v, Talbot, 134 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 
16 (Ct. App., May 8, 1990) (consent to search issue). 
Alternatively, if the stop here is analyzed as a checkpoint 
stop it clecirly does not meet the standards of reasonableness 
required of all seizures under the fourth amendment.5 Appellant 
does not contend that the police could not, in a reasonable 
manner, have temporarily controlled access to the dead-end street 
upon which the warrants were being executed and even limited 
access to those living there or otherwise having a need of entry. 
Such police control of traffic is routine at the scenes of fire 
and even in the area of highly attended sporting events. But 
that was not what was going on in this case. The police did not 
station a uniformed officer with a police car and barricades or 
flares at the entrance of the street so that approaching 
motorists could see that the police were merely restricting 
access. They were in dark, military-style uniforms rather than 
the usual uniforms that people associate with traffic control, 
and they concealed themselves so that approaching motorists would 
not know that they were to be stopped until the S.W.A.T. team 
emerged from the shadows ordering a halt. 
5
 The Untied States Supreme Court has only recently 
reaffirmed that the fourth amendment applies to even momentary 
stops of vehicles at a checkpoint. Michigan Dept. of State 
Police v. Sitz, 58 LAW WEEK 4781, 4783 (June 14, 1990). 
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In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, the Court 
distinguished the permanent immigration checkpoint which it 
upheld as reasonable, from roving stops which it had previously 
held invalid without reasonable suspicion, thusly: 
But we view checkpoint stops in a 
different light because the subjective 
intrusion—the generating of concern or even 
fright on the part of lawful travelers—is 
appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint 
stop. In Ortiz, we noted: 
"[T]he circumstances surrounding a 
checkpoint stop and search are far 
less intrusive than those attending 
a roving-patrol stop. Roving 
patrols often operate at night on 
seldom-traveled roads, and their 
approach may frighten motorists. 
At traffic checkpoints the motorist 
can see that other vehicles are 
being stopped, he can see visible 
signs of the officers1 authority, 
and he is much less likely to be 
frightened or annoyed by the 
intrusion." 422 U.S., at 894-895, 
95 S.Ct., at 2587. 
The regularized manner in which established 
checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, 
reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the 
stops are duly authorized and believed to 
serve the public interest. 
428 U.S. at 559, 96 Sup. Ct. at 3083. (Quoted in support of 
roadblocks for drunk driving detection in Michigan Dept. of 
State Police, supra, 58 LAW WEEK at 4783). Speaking of the 
selective referral of some vehicles to more intensive questioning 
15 
and inspection at the checkpoint, the Martinez-Fuerte Court said: 
Selective referral may involve some 
annoyance, but is remains true that the stops 
should not be frightening or offensive 
because of their public and relatively 
routine nature. 
428 U.S. at 560; 96 Sup. Ct. at 3084. 
The Court in Martinez-Fuerte compared the assurances 
provided to motorists by the "visible manifestations of the field 
officers1 authority at a checkpoint" to those provided by 
presentation of a warrant by a building inspector which assures 
an occupant that the inspection is operating lawfully and within 
Limits. 428 U.S. at 565, 96 Sup. Ct. at 3086. The Court also 
stated that the reasonableness of a stop at a checkpoint turns on 
factors such as the method of operation which are subject to 
judicial review. Ibid. 
Checkpoints that have been upheld by state courts have 
involved controls on the discretion of the officers in the field 
and fear-reducing features such as advance warning and 
conspicuous display of authority. See, e.g., State v. Deskins, 
234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (1983); State v. Hilleshiem, 
291 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1980); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 
479 A.2d 903, 911 (1984).6 The use of methods to reduce fear in 
6
 Utah appellate courts have not yet ruled upon the 
validity of checkpoints and roadblocks. State v. Talbot, supra, 
at n. 4. There are at least two appeals before this court, State 
16 
approaching motorists has been described as one of the "crucial 
factors11 for a permissible operational formula by commentators 
cited with approval by this court. Davis & Wallentine, A Model 
for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops 
in Utah, 3 BYU J. Pub. L. 357, 379-80, (1989), cited. State v. 
Talbot, supra, at n.4. 
The officers in the instant case conducted themselves in 
such a manner as to exacerbate rather than reduce fear and 
anxiety. Instead of giving advance and conspicuous notice of 
their authority they concealed themselves in the shadows until 
the moment of the stop. The green, military-style uniforms the 
officers wore are not readily recognized as police uniforms as 
the officer who testified readily acknowledged: 
Q [by Prosecutor] You testified that you 
tried to identify yourselves as you told the 
defendant to stop. How did you identify 
yourself? 
A I just said, "Police officers," once or 
twice. I said it as least twice. 
v. Sims, Case No. 890463CA and State v. Kitchen, Case No. 
900307CA, where organized roadblocks are being challenged on both 
federal and state constitutional grounds and because the Utah 
legislature, Sections 41-1-17 and 77-7-15, Utah Code, has limited 
police officers1 authority to stop vehicles to where an officer 
has a reasonable belief of violation of law. Appellant here does 
not concede the validity of roadblocks in Utah. However, 
appellant's main point is that if roadblocks are to be upheld, 
they must conform to standards which reduce the intrusion upon 
constitutionally protected interests to a minimum which clearly 
was not done here. 
17 
Q How close in time to this time that you 
are trying to tell him to stop are you saying 
you are a police officer? 
A When we opened the door to the truck we 
identified ourselves as police officers. 
Q What did you say? 
A We just said, "police officers. Stop." 
And somebody else said, "police officers." 
and we normally do that because of the 
problem with identifying ourselves in the 
green uniforms, because we tend to give them 
several responses of officers so that they 
know who we are and what's going on. 
(MT-29, 30). 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. STODDARD; 
Q From the time that you waved the 
defendant to have him stop, and the time you 
approached, how long was that? 
A A matter of seconds, or a couple of 
seconds at the very most. 
Q You indicated there's a problem with 
identifying yourself as a SWAT officer? 
A Yes. it's not the typical uniform most 
people deal with, so we go out of our way to 
tell people we are the police. 
Q It's been your past experience that 
people do get confused about it? 
A Yes. 
(MT-31). 
The manner in which this interception took place bears 
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little resemblance to the organized checkpoints which have been 
upheld by the courts on less than reasonable suspicion because of 
their fear reducing features. Being ambushed on a dark street by 
individuals in military uniforms coming out of the shadows is an 
entirely different experience from approaching a well marked 
checkpoint where uniformed officers are obviously merely 
conversing briefly with passing motorists. 
It is submitted that the initial stop was unreasonable under 
any standard and therefore was a constitutionally invalid 
detention requiring the suppression of the evidence derived from 
the following unconsented to searches. E.g., State v. Baird, 
supra. 
POINT II. ASSUMING THE VALIDITY OF THE 
INITIAL SEIZURE THE FURTHER DETENTION AND 
SEARCHES OF APPELLANT AND HIS VEHICLE WERE 
INVALID. 
For purposes of this argument it is assumed that the 
officers acted lawfully in stopping all persons turning into the 
dead-end street and determining their destinations. The further 
detention for questioning by narcotics officers of all persons 
going to any of the homes being searched and the searching of 
their persons for weapons constituted unreasonable searches and 
seizures under the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
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The district court concluded that reasonable and articulable 
suspicion to justify the detention was based upon the combination 
of facts that: (1) the appellant approached the area in a pick-
up truck which vehicle was consistent with those types used to 
deliver chemicals and supplies to a drug laboratory.7 (2) the 
late hour which is the time of choice for customers of drug 
dealers.8 (3) the appellant's attempt to flee the presence of 
the officers. (Conclusion 2, R-22). The district court also 
concluded: 
That the evidence of guns other weapons 
habitually associated with drug dealers and 
the presence of weapons actually found during 
the searches of the houses in the area 
provided a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that the defendant may be armed and 
thus justified the pat-down search of 
defendant's person and the cursory search of 
his truck for weapons. 
Conclusion 3, (R-22). 
It is clear from the testimony of the officers that the 
appellant was further detained and searched because he told the 
1
 A narcotics officer testified that the "number one 
transporters" used to deliver supplies to drug laboratories are 
vans. Only when specifically and leadingly asked by the 
prosecutor, did he agree that pick-up trucks are also used. (MT-
36) . 
8
 The testimony of the narcotics officer about the 
"coming and going on at hours suspected of drug dealers" is that 
it does not occur at any specific hour: "It can occur at any 
where from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The peak hours are the hours 
of darkness, it seems." (MT-34). 
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officers he was going to one of the homes being searched and a 
decision had been made, prior to the beginning of the search of 
the homes, to detain all persons headed for the homes and to 
search all persons so detained for weapons. 
Q [Defense Counsel] So was this your 
policy to do this all the time, search all 
vehicles? 
A [Sergeant Adair] Any vehicles that 
were going to those houses, or had anything 
to do with those houses, we were asked by the 
narcotics officers to detain them and notify 
them so they could talk with them. 
Our policy is to, if we are going to 
deal with them for any time, we will pat them 
down and make sure there are no weapons or 
any threats. 
Q Was this a normal policy, or was this a 
one-time policy? 
A No. That is the policy for the SWAT 
teams. 
Q So you know when you started this raid 
that you would be patting down and searching 
people who were coming into the premises? 
A Yes. 
(MT-24, 25). 
The prosecutor made a valiant effort to induce testimony 
that the further detention of the defendant was based upon the 
defendant's individual reaction to the stop and his appearance 
without notable success: 
Q [prosecutor] Okay. Let me go then 
specifically to about 11:55 p.m. On that 
occasion did you have an opportunity to see 
a pickup truck or have a pickup truck 
approach this roadblock? 
A [Sergeant Adair] Yes. 
Q What were the circumstances and what 
did you observe? 
A We were standing at the entrance to the 
road, and the pickup truck pulled into the 
entrance of the road. We approached the 
vehicle, and as we approached we waved at him 
to stop. 
He stopped the vehicle, and then put the 
vehicle in reverse as if to back out. About 
that time Sergeant Winkler opened the door to 
the vehicle and told him to just stop the 
vehicle, and we identified ourselves as 
police officers. 
Q You say the car approached you, then 
tried to back out. How close to the car were 
you when the car tried to back out? 
A Oh, just a few feet, probably. Three or 
four feet. 
Q Was that done fairly slowly or fairly 
abruptly? 
A It was pretty abrupt. 
Q Were you able to see the driver at that 
time? 
A Yes. 
Q What was the lighting like in the area? 
A There was some street lights in the 
area. It was dark. It was nighttime, but 
there were some street lights, so the 
lighting was fairly good. 
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Q Could you see the driver's face as he 
sat there? 
A Yes. 
Q Was there anything unusual about the 
driver's face or his expression as this was 
all occurring? 
A He looked kind of panicky or startled. 
I don't know if it was because of our 
approach and the fact that the hour, or what. 
But he had kind of a panicky look on his 
face. 
Q Given that information, then, why did 
you pursue that car and stop it once it tried 
to back out? 
A We had been asked by the Metro people to 
stop anyone that pulled onto the street, just 
because they were curious as to any 
deliveries being made to this lab. 
There was a possibility of chemicals 
being delivered, or drugs being transported 
to or from it. So they asked us to stop 
anyone that pulled into the street that 
looked like they meant to be there, and 
question them about their intent. 
Q So what happened when you stopped the 
car? 
A Sergeant Winkler opened the door. We 
identified ourselves as police officers and 
asked the gentleman to put the truck and step 
out and walk with us, which he did. 
Q Did you ask him where he was going? 
A Yes. 
Q What did he say? 
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A He pointed up to the house. He said he 
was going up to the end of the street and — 
Q Which house was at the end of the 
street? 
A Well, two of the houses involved in the 
search warrants were at the end of the 
street on the south side. 
Q Were there any houses not associated 
with the search that were at the end of the 
street? 
A There were some on the north side of the 
street, yes. 
Q Did you distinguish with the defendant 
whether he was going to one of those houses 
not related or one of the houses related? 
A. Yes. I talked with him. I asked him to 
get out of the truck, and I asked him, you 
know, more specifically where he was headed. 
And he mentioned the name Bailey, which was 
one of the people involved in one of the 
houses on that street that was being 
searched. 
Q Was there anything unusual about the 
defendant about the appearance of himself or 
his vehicle at that time? 
A Not—it was—I would say that it was 
somewhat unusual in his dress and attire. He 
wasn't the typical person that you would run 
into all the time* 
Q What do you mean by that? 
A He had long hair, a beard, he looked— 
appeared to me to be maybe a motorcycle type 
person, somebody that hangs out with 
motorcycle gangs. I don't know. He kind of 
had that appearance to him. 
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Q So what did you do after receiving the 
information and seeing what you saw there at 
the scene? 
A We had him step out of the truck when we 
determined he was involved with the people 
that were being searched on the street. We 
patted him down for weapons. The officers 
looked through the truck for weapons. The 
SWAT officers. During that search they 
located a gym bag that had some marijuana in 
it, so the. . • • 
(MT-12, 15). 
At the trial, the same officer gave similar testimony but 
was even clearer on the point that the detention and search were 
based solely upon the appellant's destination rather than his 
reaction: 
Q [by Defense Counsel] So you say you 
shined your flashlight and jumped out. Did 
you move rapidly or slowly? 
A We just stepped out in the roadway and 
held our hands up and waved him down. 
Q Did he go past you? 
A No, he stopped about even with us. His 
door was pretty close to where we were. 
Q But you came out from his right side, 
the passenger side? 
A His left side, the driver's side. 
Q You stepped out from the driver's side? 
A Correct. 
Q And this street, it goes up hill, does 
it not, from the main road? 
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A Yeah, it's a slight grade. 
Q And you say he stopped? 
A Yes. 
Q He started to move backward? 
A Yes. He put the vehicle in reserve 
[sic] and just barely started to move 
backward. 
Q Barely started to move backward. How do 
you know he put it in reverse? 
A Just his actions, as I recall. I think 
it was an automatic and he worked the lever 
and the vehicle started to make a reverse 
movement. 
Q Do you know whether he just simply put 
it into neutral or just started to roll back? 
A Well, I don't know. It could have been 
neutral, it's hard to say on that, but he did 
start to move. And when we opened the door 
we asked him to put the vehicle in park and 
shut it down. 
Q So as far as you know, the car started 
to roll backward? 
A It started moving backward, yes. 
Q It just moved, what a foot or two? 
A Probably about that far. 
Q And he did not accelerate, gun the 
engine to get out of there or anything like 
that? 
A No. 
Q So Sergeant Winkler was just able to 
open the door? 
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A Yes, 
Q And talk to him? 
A Yes. 
Q And at that time all you knew was that 
he was going up the street? 
A Yes. 
Q That's the only thing that would concern 
you? 
A Yes. 
Q And your purpose was to keep him from 
anybody? To stop people, to prevent them 
from going up that street or— 
A Yes. 
Q —just inquire whether they lived there 
or in the— 
A Excuse me. 
Q Your purpose was to inquire whether they 
lived on that street? 
A Yeah. It was to determine their 
business and determine whether we would let 
them up the street. 
Q And on what basis would you let them up 
the street? 
A If they lived in the houses that weren't 
involved, then we would have had them park 
the vehicle in another location nearby and 
escort them to their residence. 
Q And if they're just going to there to visi 
A If they were going to visit someone 
other than the houses involved, then we 
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probably would have either escorted them up 
there or have them identify the people in 
that house and arranged for them to get 
there. 
Q And what were you going to do if they 
were going to visit one of the houses 
involved? 
A We'd been asked by the Metro detective 
to hold on to anyone that was going to those 
houses so that they could come and talk to 
them and find out what their business was 
there• There were some outstanding people 
that they were looking for that were involved 
in the lab houses and they had hoped that 
some of them might arrive while we were 
there. 
Q So you had a plan ahead of time of what 
you were going to do specifically if somebody 
said I'm going to one of these houses? 
A We would detain them and notify the 
Metro Narcotics people and have them respond 
to talk to them. 
Q Do you know—what do you mean detain? 
Just let them sit in their car, get them out? 
A Our normal procedure would be to—in 
that situation with the type of thing we" s 
dealt with on the initial entry of the 
houses, we would have them step out of the 
V€»hicle and search the vehicle for weapons 
and pat them down for weapons and then allow 
them to sit in the vehicle. And the 
narcotics detectives were just a matter of 
one or two minutes away. We would just have 
them remain in the vehicle until a detective 
got there. 
(TT-16-19). 
The district court's conclusion that the appellant attempted 
28 
to flee and this raised a suspicion in the officers mind that led 
to further detention and the searches is clearly erroneous in 
view of the officer's testimony9. There is no indication in the 
testimony that the officer believed the appellant was attempting 
to escape or that the officer's decision was in any way 
9
 Appellant recognizes the rule that fl[i]n the absence of 
clear error, [the court will] uphold a trial judge's factual 
assessment underlying a decision to grant or deny a suppression 
motion". State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, (Utah 1989). The court 
hearing the motion is of course in the best position to evaluate 
the creditability of witnesses. However, here the testimony of 
the state's own witnesses simply does not support the district 
court's conclusions that there was an escape attempt. 
Even if the evidence had indicated that the appellant 
attempted to escape, it still was not the reason the appellant 
was detained. In State v. Talbot, supra, a sheriff posse 
stopped a vehicle because it appeared to evade a roadblock. The 
State argued that the evidence also showed that traffic 
violations occurred which would have justified the stop (a fact 
situation which is converse to the instant cases). The court 
said: 
It is obvious to us from the evidence 
produced at the suppression hearing that the 
stop was not based at the time upon any 
traffic violations but rather upon the 
conclusion, however flawed, that avoidance of 
the roadblock gave rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. It is 
inconsequential that the officers could have 
stopped the vehicle for one or more traffic 
violations where in fact the stop was for 
other reasons. 
134 Utah Adv. at 17. Here, the reason for the detention and 
search articulated repeatedly by the officer was that he had 
orders to detain and search all persons whose destination was one 
of the homes being searched. 
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influenced by the defendant's reaction. In fact, from the 
officer's testimony concerning a normal person's reaction to a 
sudden appearance by a S.W.A.T. team in olive drab uniforms, it 
is apparent that the officer believed the appellant's reaction 
was not unusual.10 
The issue then is whether police may lawfully detain and 
search for weapons all persons who the police know to be enroute 
to visit a home which is being searched, pursuant to a warrant, 
for controlled substances. (This is a different question from 
whether the police could turn such visitors away while a search 
is underway). 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88, S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 889 
(1968), the Supreme Court held that a police officer who observed 
two men engaging in conduct which raised a reasonable suspicion 
they were about to rob a store acted reasonably under the fourth 
amendment in detaining them and, because he reasonably believed 
they were armed and dangerous, acted reasonably in "frisking" 
1 0
 There are various non-incriminating explanations for 
the appellant's vehicle rolling back a foot or two. The officer 
conceded it might have simply been the result of it being in 
neutral (TT-17) and that the appellant appeared startled by the 
manner in which he was approached (MT-12) a not unusual reaction 
for an innocent person who is suddenly surrounded by dark figures 
at a late hour. Or, the appellant may have been confused and 
believed the officers were telling him he was not supposed to be 
there. It was the officer's experience that people have a 
problem identifying the S.W.A.T. team as officers and get 
confused. (MT-31). 
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them for weapons. At the outset, it should be observed that the 
Terry "stop and frisk" exception to the probable cause and 
warrant requirements of the fourth amendment was predicated upon 
the exigent circumstances confronting an officer in a unexpected 
and rapidly developing situation, for the Court stated: 
We do not retreat from our holdings that 
the police must, whenever practicable, obtain 
advance judicial approval of searches and 
seizures through the warrant procedure, 
[citations omitted] or that in most instances 
failure to comply with the warrant 
requirement can only be excused by exigent 
circumstances. [citations omitted] But we 
deal here with an entire rubic of police 
conduct—necessarily swift action predicated 
upon the on-the-spot observations of the 
officer on the beat—which historically has 
not been, and as a practical matter could not 
be, subjected to the warrant procedure. 
88 S. Ct. at 1879, 392 U.S. at 20. 
The instant case was a far cry from such an exigent 
circumstance. Before the operation began, the police 
anticipated that visitors might approach the homes during the 
search and planned and executed a trap for them. Search warrants 
were obtained for the homes involved but no request was made to 
the magistrate for permission to either establish a checkpoint or 
detain and search all visitors. (MT-45). The officers1 on their 
own authority simply decided, in advance, to expand the scope of 
the search from the homes to all people who came into the street 
to visit any of the searched homes. As argued to the district 
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court, this conduct by the police constituted and impermissible 
evasion of the warrant requirement.11 (TT-49). 
In Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 
L.Ed.2d. 238 (1979), police executing a search warrant for heroin 
upon a bar room and a named bartender frisked the patrons present 
in the room for weapons locating heroin on the person of Ybarra, 
a visitor, in the process. The trial court had held the search 
to be a valid search to prevent destruction of evidence under a 
state statute permitting such searches. 444 U.S. at 90, 100 S. 
Ct. at 341. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed because among 
other reasons the search was "conducted in a one room bar where 
it [was] obvious, that. . .heroin was being sold" and "Ybarra was 
not an innocent stranger having no connection with the premises". 
Ibid. The Supreme Court reversed stating: 
a person's propinquity to others 
independently suspected of criminal activity 
does not, without more, give rise to probable 
caiuse to search that person. 
444 U.S. at 92, 100 S. Ct. at 342. The state attempted to 
justify the "frisk for weapons" under the Terry exception but the 
1 1
 It is noteworthy that the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, in the case involving the home to which 
appellant was headed, suppressed evidence found in a visitor's 
car parked within the curtilage of that home for the reason that 
the search of that car was outside the scope of the warrant, 
United States v. Gottschalk, U.S. Dist. Ct. Utah, Case No. CR 89-
165, Transcript, Jan. 5, 1990, Addendum A. 
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Court held: 
The "narrow scope" of the Terrv exception 
does not permit a frisk for weapons on less 
than reasonable belief or suspicion directed 
at the person to be frisked/ even though that 
person happens to be on premises where an 
authorized narcotics search is taking place. 
444 U.S. at 94, 100 S. Ct. at 343. (Emphasis added). The 
Supreme Court thus required the facts supporting a belief that 
Ybarra might be armed derive from facts about Mr. Ybarra not from 
what is known about others who might be present to engage in the 
narcotics trade. 
In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 
L.Ed.2d. 340 (1981), the Court did Hold that the detention of a 
person who resided in a home was implicitly authorized by a 
warrant for that home. Accord, state v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 
(Utah 1986) . However, in doing so, the Supreme Court 
distinguished the detention of an occupant from the search of a 
visitor for weapons that took place in Ybarra. 452 U.S. at 696, 
n. A, 101 S. Ct. at 2590, n. 4. 
In the instant case there were no facts concerning appellant 
articulated as reasons for his detention other than he was a 
person intending to visit one of the homes being searched at 
11:50 p.m. There were no facts concerning appellant articulated 
for the search for weapons—it was simply the policy of the 
S.W.A.T team to search all persons detained. The facts that he 
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had long hair and looked like a motorcycle person, was driving a 
pick-up truck, and appeared startled and his car rolled one or 
two feet backward when first stopped were not given as reasons 
for the detention by the officer and in any event would not raise 
a reasonable fear that he was armed and dangerous. The other 
"facts" concerning the propensity of people engaged in the drug 
trade to be armed and to conduct business at night are simply not 
transferable to the appellant under Ybarra, supra, and Brown v. 
Texas, supra, (Presence in an alley with high intensity of drug 
trafficking not sufficient). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, it violated the fourth amendment to 
intercept all persons entering the street where homes were being 
searched, detain all persons who gave a searched home as their 
destination, and search for weapons the persons so detained and 
their vehicles. Accordingly, it was error to deny the motion to 
suppress and to admit into evidence the money and contraband 
seized without which there could have been no conviction. This 
court should reverse the judgment and sentence of the district 
court. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES D I S T R I C T COURT .. jtf> 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION \t^ 
* ^
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
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Civil No. CR89-165 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID K. WINDER, JUDGE 
HELD JANUARY 5, 1990 
APPEARANCES: 
For the United States of America: Wayne T. Dance, Esq. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We are here in the matter of the USA 
versus Bruce T. Gottschalk. And Mr. Gottschalk is here in 
person. He is represented by Mr. G. Fred Metos and Mr. Wayne 
T. Dance is here. This is 89CR-165W. 
We've got a motion to dismiss and a motion in liming 
we need to hear. Yesterday, the motion to suppress, as it 
relates to the items contained in the Cadillac was argued 
before me. Since that time. I have done further reading 
and thinking about this matter. And I think the motion to 
suppress, as it relates to items taken out of the Cadillac, 
must be granted and I grant it-
I think in order for that search warrant that 
authorized a search of the premises to include a vehicle on 
the premises, it's got to be owned or under the control of 
the owner of the premises, in this case, William Bailey. 
And I don't think the evidence establishes that at or prior 
to the time that that Cadillac was searched, that it was under 
his domination and control, even though he was the owner of 
the premises and this inoperable Cadillac with the keys in 
the ignition and the engine out of it was on his premises. 
And the Magistrate found, and I affirm, there were 
no exigent circumstances, there is no public danger, and there 
was no mention of the Cadillac in the Affidavit in Support 
A -2 
of the search warrant. 
And so, I grant the motion to suppress, and nothing 
will be introduced at this trial what was taken from the 
Cadillac. So, now let's go to the motion to dismiss. I have 
now read those motions. 
(Conclusion of partial transcript.) 
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